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Abstract
An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should
decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk
of being infected and the cost of being protected. The network members can make decisions repeatedly, based on
information that they receive about the changing infection level in the network.
We study the equilibrium states reached by a network whose members increase (resp. decrease) their security
deployment when learning that the network infection is widespread (resp. limited). Our main finding is that the
equilibrium level of infection increases as the learning rate of the members increases. We confirm this result in three
scenarios for the behavior of the members: strictly rational cost minimizers, not strictly rational, and strictly rational
but split into two response classes. In the first two cases, we completely characterize the stability and the domains
of attraction of the equilibrium points, even though the first case leads to a differential inclusion. We validate our
conclusions with simulations on human mobility traces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Epidemiology research has made extensive use of disease spreading models to study how a virus propagates in
a human population [16]. Shortly after the appearance of self-replicating malicious programs in computers, aptly
named computer viruses, security researchers turned to epidemic models to study the propagation of these programs
[20], [19]. More recently, the proliferation of capable mobile devices, such as smartphones, made mobile networks
a fertile ground for spreading malware [17], [1]. The propagation characteristics of malware in such networks have
been studied and countermeasures have been proposed [28], [12], [9], [33], [21], [7].
Countermeasures to an infection can be centrally enforced, or the decision for their adoption can be left to
individual agents such as individual home computer users, companies, or people in a society. Centralized enforcing
is more likely to work in tightly controlled environments, such as within a company network where the users are
obliged to abide by the company security policy. However, when it is up to individual agents to invest in protection
against infection [18], [23], [6], [27], there appear contradicting incentives. Although agents want to be safe against
real or virtual viruses, they would prefer to avoid investing in security: Security not only costs money, but it usually
also reduces the utility of the network by, for example, isolating the agent from the rest of the network, or it reduces
the utility of the device by, for example, slowing it down [32]. Another counter-incentive is that the security of a
network agent exhibits positive externalities with respect to the decisions of others: If others patch their computers,
everyone becomes more secure, even those who do not patch their own computer. If others are vaccinated, everyone
becomes safer, even those who are not vaccinated. Therefore, agents have an incentive to free-ride on the security
investments of others, reaping the benefits without paying the costs. More background on computer network security
and individual incentives can be found in two recent books [5], [8].
However, to the best of our knowledge, only static incentives of agents have been studied: Users are modeled
as only making a once-and-for-all decision to install or not a security product. Herein lies our goal: Agents do
not choose only once whether they will invest in security or not. They balance between the cost and benefit of
their investment, and the cost and benefit typically change with time. Security advisories exist about current and
newly emerging threats in popular technology products [2], [1], and about current and newly emerging human
epidemics [3]. We study how changing incentives influence the security decisions and the resulting infection level
in the network.
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2We model agents as more likely to invest in security when the infection level is high and as less likely to invest,
or more likely to divest, when the infection level is low. On the one hand, if people receive news of an ongoing
epidemic, they are much more willing to protect themselves: the prevalence of AIDS has been observed to increase
risk avoidance, either through increased condom use [4], or through behavioral risk avoidance [31].
On the other hand, when the infection has subsided and there is no clear danger, complacency may set in with a
consequent reduction in the efforts and capital expended to ensure safety. Neglect of human epidemics that are at
the point of near extinction has led to their resurgence [15]. Also, companies and users are not easily convinced to
buy security products [29]. If the threat is not extremely clear or imminent (“One solution [for selling security] is to
stoke fear.” [29]), users will resist investing in security, they will divest, or they will stop renewing their investment.
In human epidemic modeling it has already been recommended [10] to incorporate into models the changing
behavior of humans towards protection against ongoing epidemics. In a recently proposed model [13], the awareness
for the epidemic spreads in parallel with the disease itself. In particular, the awareness is spread from the aware to
the unaware part of the population at some rate and then lost again or forgotten at a different rate. Aware users are
less likely to contract the disease because, for example, they choose to stay at home. Nevertheless, we note that a
user alternates between states of awareness and unawareness mechanically, without making the decision himself,
so we cannot speak of individual incentives in this case.
In this paper, we model individuals’ changing responses that depend myopically on the fluctuating infection
level in an ongoing epidemic. We combine the epidemic propagation with a game theoretic description of the user
behavior into an Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) model.
We find that the network reaches an endemic equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium where the infection persists.
We reach the counterintuitive conclusion that the higher the learning rate (the rate at which users learn what the
infection level is), the higher the infection level at the equilibrium. The effect of the learning rate is less pronounced
when the users are more conservative, i.e., when they are willing to invest in protection at lower infection levels.
These conclusions hold across the various user behavior functions that we model.
When users are strictly rational cost minimizers, leading to discontinuous best response dynamics, our model
turns into a system of differential inclusions, which can also be viewed as a switched nonlinear system [24]. We
prove that there can be no periodic solutions, there can only be equilibrium points. We characterize the domains
of attraction for these points, as well as prove (local) asymptotic stability results. These findings, presented in
Section III, might also be of theoretical interest for switched nonlinear systems, as the bulk of the research on
switched systems is focused on the linear case [25].
To account for users who are not strictly rational, we study behavior functions that are continuous. These functions
are arbitrary except for the requirement that users be more willing to become and stay protected as the current
level of infection increases. We prove system properties that are similar to those in the strictly rational case.
We use simulations on human mobility traces to confirm our main theoretical conclusion that a higher learning
rate leads to a higher infection level.
To account for heterogeneity among users, we also study a system with two classes of users (easily extensible
to more than two), each with a different sensitivity to the infection level: Users in the first class (Responsible)
become protected at lower levels of an infection, whereas users in the second class (Selfish) become protected only
at higher levels, thus in a sense free-riding on the security investment of the first class. In this case, too, it holds
that a higher learning rate leads to a higher infection level, which we also confirm with simulations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe our model for the evolution of the
network state, comprising an epidemic propagation component and a user behavior component. We study users with
a strictly rational behavior (Section III), then users with non-strictly rational behavior (Section IV), followed by
users with heterogeneous behavior (Section V). In Section VI we present an empirical validation of our conclusions
through simulations on human mobility traces.
II. MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC PROPAGATION AND USER BEHAVIOR
A. Epidemic Propagation
There are N users in the network. Each user can be in one of three states:
• Susceptible, denoted by S: The user does not currently deploy security and is not infected.
3Event Effect ∆x
Meeting between S and I 1
N
(−1,+1, 0)
Update of S 1
N
(−pSP (x), 0,+pSP (x))
Update of P 1
N
(+pPS(x), 0,−pPS(x))
Disinfection of I 1
N
(0,−1,+1)
TABLE I: Possible events and their effect on the network state
• Infected, denoted by I: The user is infected by the virus and will spread it to any susceptible user he makes
contact with.
• Protected, denoted by P : The user deploys security and is therefore immune to the virus.
The number and fraction of users in each state are denoted, respectively, by NS , NI , NP and S, I, P . It follows
that NS +NI +NP = N and S + I + P = 1. The state of the network is x = (S, I, P ), and the set of possible
states is X = 1
N
N
3 = {NS
N
, NI
N
, NP
N
}.
The evolution of the network state x is described as a Continuous Time Markov Process, as follows. With each
user a Poisson alarm clock of rate β + γ + δ is associated. When the clock of user i rings – say at time t – one
of three events happens:
M With probability β
β+γ+δ , user i has a meeting with another user, chosen uniformly at random. If the meeting is
between a Susceptible and an Infected user, the Susceptible user becomes Infected. Otherwise nothing happens.
U With probability γ
β+γ+δ , user i receives an update about the network state x, and he has the opportunity to
revise his current strategy if his state is S or P . If i’s state is S, he switches to P with probability pSP (x).
If i’s state is P , he switches to S with probability pPS(x). If i is Infected, nothing happens.
D With probability δ
β+γ+δ , user i has a disinfection opportunity. That is, if i is Infected, he becomes disinfected,
and we assume he becomes Protected. If i is not Infected, nothing happens.
Table I summarizes the possible events and their effect on the network state.
We consider the large population scenario, i.e., the limit N −→∞. Kurtz [22] and Ljung [26] show that, when
N −→∞, the Continuous Time Markov Process described previously converges to a deterministic function, which
is the solution to a system of Ordinary Differential Equations:
d
dt
S = −βSI − γSpSP (x) + γPpPS(x) (1a)
d
dt
I = βSI − δI (1b)
d
dt
P = δI + γSpSP (x)− γPpPS(x) (1c)
Since S+ I+P = 1, we can eliminate one of the three state variables. We eliminate P , and the system becomes
d
dt
S = −βSI − γSpSP (x) + γ(1− S − I)pPS(x) (2a)
d
dt
I = βSI − δI, (2b)
together with P = 1−S−I . The state space is D = (S, I), 0 ≤ S, I ≤ 1, S+I ≤ 1, and it is bounded. This system
is two dimensional and autonomous. Note that for γ = 0, the model is identical to the standard SIR epidemic model
[16] (R stands for Recovered).
Remark: The results of Kurtz and Ljung hold when the resulting deterministic equations are continuous. As
we will see when discussing the behavior of users (Sec. II-B), the functions pPS(x) and pSP (x) can also be
discontinuous, and indeed multivalued at the discontinuity. Gast and Gaujal [14] prove a similar convergence result
for the multivalued case: the trajectory of the stochastic system converges in probability to a solution of a differential
inclusion, as opposed to a differential equation. If the solution is unique, the stochastic system converges to it so
the situation is as in the continuous case. If there are multiple solutions, then the stochastic system can converge
to any of them. In the section on the discontinuous dynamics, we will resolve the issue of uniqueness of solutions.
4We will denote the right-hand side of the system (2) by F (x), and we will slightly abuse the notation for x to
be x = (S, I), x ∈ D. So, the system (2) will be written
d
dt
x = F (x) (3)
for the differential equation, or
d
dt
x ∈ F (x) (4)
for the differential inclusion; the one we refer to will be clear from the context.
B. User Behavior
As can be seen from the epidemic propagation model, the only point at which the users can make a choice is
at an update event. We assume that there is a cost cI associated with becoming Infected, and a cost cP associated
with becoming Protected. It holds that cI > cP > 0. There is no cost for being Susceptible. Note that these costs
need not be the actual costs; what influences the decisions of users are the costs as perceived by the users.
If we assume that each user behaves strictly rationally, the choice between Susceptible and Protected depends
on which state minimizes the user’s expected cost. Specifically, given the aforementioned model of random pair
meetings, a user’s expected cost at a particular network state x = (S, I) is cP if he chooses to be Protected and
IcI if he chooses to be Susceptible, thus risking infection. Therefore, the user’s decision would be S if IcI < cP ,
and P if IcI > cP . In this case, the functions pSP (x) and pPS(x) would be step functions of I:
pSP (x) = pSP (I) = 1{IcI > cP } (5)
pPS(x) = pPS(I) = 1{IcI < cP }. (6)
If IcI = cP , then both choices are optimal, and any randomization between them is also optimal. So, when
IcI = cP , the functions pSP (I) and pPS(I) are multivalued. For convenience, we define
I∗ ≡ cP
cI
. (7)
Note that if we were to set I∗ to a value larger than 1, then pSP would always be equal to 0, pPS would always be
equal to 1, and our model would be identical to the SIRS model [16]. We revisit this connection when discussing
equilibrium points whose I-coordinate is less than I∗ (Section III-C).
To account for users that cannot be assumed to be strictly rational, or their perception of the cost is not crisp (e.g.,
they are not sure about the exact values of cI and cP ), or they take the network state report to not be completely
accurate, we consider a different scenario for the functions pSP (·) and pPS(·). We assume that they can be arbitrary
functions of I , as long as the former is non-decreasing with I and the latter is non-increasing with I .
Finally, to account for users with different characteristics, we will consider multiple user classes, each with a
different (discontinuous) response function.
In what follows, first we will consider the case that pSP (·) and pPS(·) are discontinuous step functions and
actually multivalued at the discontinuity. Then, we will consider the case that they are continuously differentiable.
Last, we will go into the multiple user class scenario.
III. THE USERS ARE STRICTLY RATIONAL
The best response correspondence dictates the shape of pSP (I) and pPS(I):
pSP (I) =


0, I < I∗
[0, 1], I = I∗
1, I > I∗
pPS(I) =


1, I < I∗
[0, 1], I = I∗
0, I > I∗
. (8)
We now have to solve the differential inclusion (recall (2) and (4))
d
dt
x ∈ F (x), x ∈ D. (9)
The vector field of F (x) is plotted in Figure 1 for various values of the parameters.
We define a partition of the state space D into three domains: D− = D∩{(S, I), I < I∗}, D+ = D∩{(S, I), I >
I∗}, and L = D ∩ {(S, I) : I = I∗}. The domain L will also be referred to as the discontinuity line.
5A. Existence of Solutions
A solution for this differential inclusion [11] is an absolutely continuous vector function x(t) defined on an
interval J for which d
dt
x(t) ∈ F (x(t)) almost everywhere on J . From the theory of differential inclusions we know
that a solution of (9) exists if, for every x ∈ D, the basic conditions apply: The set F (x) is nonempty, bounded,
closed, convex, and the function F is upper semi-continuous.
A set-valued function f(x) is called upper semi-continuous at the point x if ρ(f(x′), f(x)) −→ 0 as x′ −→ x.
The function ρ(A,B) is one characterization of the distance between two nonempty closed sets A and B:
ρ(A,B) = sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
d(a, b), (10)
where d(·, ·) is the Euclidean distance between two points.
The basic conditions apply in our case:
For every x /∈ L, the set F (x) is a singleton, hence, it is nonempty, bounded, closed, and convex; additionally,
the function F is continuous at x, hence, it is also upper semi-continuous.
At each point x ∈ L, the set F (x) is the segment
F (S, I∗) =
(−βSI∗ + γ[−S, 1− S − I∗]
βSI∗ − δI∗
)
, (11)
which is the smallest convex closed set containing all the limit values of F (x′) for x′ −→ x ∈ L. When x′ −→ x
from D+, the limit value of F (x) is (−βSI∗ − γS
βSI∗ − δI∗
)
, (12)
and when x′ −→ x from D−, the limit value of F (x) is(−βSI∗ + γ(1− S − I∗)
βSI∗ − δI∗
)
. (13)
The set F (S, I∗) is bounded and upper semi-continuous [11, Lemma 3, §6].
B. Uniqueness of Solutions
In general, because the right-hand side of (9) is multivalued, even though two solutions at time t0 are both at
the point x0, they may not coincide on an interval t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 for any t1 > t0. If any two solutions that coincide at
t0 also coincide until some t1 > t0, then we say that right uniqueness holds at (t0, x0). Left uniqueness at (t0, x0)
is defined similarly (with t1 < t0), and (right and left) uniqueness in a domain holds, if it holds at each point of
the domain.
The solution is unique in D− and in D+ because F has continuous partial derivatives there.
We will now show when a solution of (9) lying on the line of discontinuity L can be uniquely continued in the
direction of increasing t. We will see that all solutions can be uniquely continued, except those that start at the
point (S, I) =
(
δ
β
, I∗
)
. Those latter solutions all start at the same point and then diverge, but none of them can
ever approach that point again in the positive direction of time (the proof is in Lemma 1). So, if we ignore the
initial point of those solutions, all solutions can be uniquely continued.
Formally, let F−(x) and F+(x) be the limiting values of the function F at a point x ∈ L as F approaches x
from D− and from D+, respectively. Let h(x) = F+(x) − F−(x), and F−N , F+N , hN be the projections of the
vectors F−, F+, h onto the vector n = (0, 1)T , the normal to L directed from D− to D+ at the point x.
The values of these vectors and projections are:
F−(x) = (−βSI∗ + γ(1 − S − I∗), βSI∗ − δI∗)T (14)
F+(x) = (−βSI∗ − γS, βSI∗ − δI∗)T (15)
h(x) = (−γS − γ(1− S − I∗), 0)T (16)
F−N = βSI
∗ − δI∗ (17)
F+N = βSI
∗ − δI∗ (18)
hN = 0 (19)
6We know [11, §10, Corollary 1] that on the discontinuity line L, at the points where F−N > 0, F+N > 0 (or
F−N < 0, F
+
N < 0) the solutions pass from D− into D+ (correspondingly, from D+ into D−) and uniqueness is
not violated. So, at no point of L is uniqueness violated, except at (S, I) = ( δ
β
, I∗).
A solution that passes from the point (S, I) = ( δ
β
, I∗) will either stay there (if 0 ∈ F ( δ
β
, I∗), i.e., if ( δ
β
, I∗) is an
equilibrium point) or it can be continued in multiple ways, all tangent to L as d
dt
I = 0 when S = δ
β
. Each of these
multiple solutions corresponds to a different value of F ( δ
β
, I∗). More details on these trajectories can be found in
the proof of Lemma 1.
I
S
X0
I = I∗
0
1
1
(a) The case δ ≥ β. The only equilibrium
point is X0 = (1, 0). It is stable and all
trajectories converge to it.
I
S
X0
X1
S = δ
β
I =
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
I = I∗
0
1
1
(b) The case δ < β and I∗ > 1−
δ
β
1+ δ
γ
. The
point X1 =
(
δ
β
,
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
)
is a stable equilib-
rium point, similarly to the SIRS model.
I
S
X0
X2
S = δ
β
I =
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
I = I∗
0
1
1
(c) The case δ < β and I∗ ≤ 1−
δ
β
1+ δ
γ
. The
point X2 =
(
δ
β
, I∗
)
is a stable equilibrium
point.
Fig. 1: The vector field of the system and the equilibrium points for all regions of the parameter space. At the point
(S, I), an arrow parallel to (dS
dt
, dI
dt
) is plotted. In cases (b) and (c), the point X0 = (1, 0) is also an equilibrium
point but it is unstable. All trajectories converge to X1 or X2, respectively, except those that start on the axis I = 0,
which converge to X0.
C. Stationary Points
The stationary points are found by solving for x the inclusion 0 ∈ F (x).
71) Stationary points above the discontinuity line: There can be no stationary points in the domain D+. The
system becomes
d
dt
S = −βSI − γS (20a)
d
dt
I = βSI − δI. (20b)
From the first equation, we see that S has to be zero. But then the second equation implies that I also has to be
zero, which is not an admissible value for I as I = 0 cannot be above the discontinuity line.
2) Stationary points below the discontinuity line: We look for stationary points in the domain D−. The system
becomes
d
dt
S = −βSI + γ(1− S − I) (21a)
d
dt
I = βSI − δI, (21b)
which is identical to the SIRS case (recall the discussion in the User Behavior section) except that the domain is
not the whole state space, it is only D−.
This system has the solutions:
X0 = (S0, I0) = (1, 0) (22)
X1 = (S1, I1) =
(
δ
β
,
1− δ
β
1 + δ
γ
)
. (23)
The second solution, X1, is admissible if and only if X1 ∈ D−, i.e.,
δ
β
≤ 1, (24)
and also
1− δ
β
1 + δ
γ
< I∗. (25)
Note that if δ
β
= 1, then X0 and X1 coincide. Also, it is not surprising that X1 is the equilibrium point of the
corresponding SIRS model. That is, I∗ does not play an explicit role in this case, as long as (25) holds.
3) Stationary points on the discontinuity line: We look for stationary points on the discontinuity line I = I∗,
that is, we solve the inclusion 0 ∈ F (S, I∗) for S. The system becomes
d
dt
S = −βSI∗ + [−γS, γ(1 − S − I∗)] (26a)
d
dt
I = βSI∗ − δI∗. (26b)
Since I∗ > 0, d
dt
I is zero only when S = δ
β
. We then have to check if it is possible to make d
dt
S equal to zero,
that is, if 0 ∈ F ( δ
β
, I∗). We find that it is possible when I∗ is such that
I∗ ≤
1− δ
β
1 + δ
γ
. (27)
In that case, the stationary point is
X2 = (S2, I2) =
(
δ
β
, I∗
)
. (28)
In general, there are many combinations of pSP (I∗) and pPS(I∗) that make ddtS equal to zero, but there is always
one with pSP (I∗) = 0. In that case, pPS(I∗) = δI
∗
γ(1− δ
β
−I∗)
.
To summarize, X0 exists always. If δ < β, one more equilibrium point exists: X1 if I∗ >
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
, or X2 otherwise.
In Figure 1 we can see these equilibrium points.
8D. Local Asymptotic Stability
1) Stability of X0 and X1: We show that, when δβ ≥ 1, X0 is asymptotically stable. When δβ < 1, X0 is a
saddle point, and if X1 exists it is asymptotically stable.
We now examine whether X0 and X1 are (locally) stable equilibrium points. The Jacobian of the system is
J(S, I) =
(−βI − γ −βS − γ
βI βS − δ
)
(29)
We evaluate the Jacobian at the point X0:
J(X0) = J(0, 1) =
(−γ −β − γ
0 β − δ
)
(30)
The eigenvalues of J(X0) are −γ and β − δ. So, X0 is stable if and only if β < δ, in which case note that X1
does not exist.
We evaluate the Jacobian at the point X1:
J(X1) = J
(
δ
β
,
1− δ
β
1 + δ
γ
)
=

− β+γ1+ δγ −δ − γ
β−δ
1+ δ
γ
0

 (31)
The eigenvalues of J(X1) are
a11±
√
a2
11
+4a12a21
2 , where aij are the elements of J(X1) (a22 = 0). Since a11 < 0,
the smallest eigenvalue is always negative. The largest one is negative if and only if a12a21 < 0⇔ β > δ. So X1
is stable whenever it exists.
If we evaluate the square root
√
a211 + 4a12a21 at the point β = γ(1 +
γ
δ
)2 − γ2 , we see that its argument can
also take negative values. Since the eigenvalues are a continuous function of β, they will have an imaginary part
for β close to γ(1 + γ
δ
)2 − γ2 , which means that the trajectories spiral towards X1.
2) Stability of X2: To show that the stationary point on the discontinuity line is asymptotically stable, we will
use Theorem 1 below [11, §19, Theorem 3]. To use this theorem we transform the system so that the line of
discontinuity is the horizontal axis, the stationary point is (0, 0), and the trajectories have a clockwise direction for
increasing t.
We set x = δ
β
− S and y = I − I∗. The domains D,D−,D+ become G = {(x, y)|x ≤ δ
β
, y ≥ −I∗, y − x ≤
1− I∗ − δ
β
}, G− = G ∩ {(x, y)|y < 0}, and G+ = G ∩ {(x, y)|y > 0}. Then, the system can be written as
dx
dt
= P−(x, y) = −βxy − (βI∗ + γ)x+ (γ + δ)y − γ(1− I∗) + δ(I∗ + γ
β
) (32a)
dy
dt
= Q−(x, y) = −βx(y + I∗) (32b)
for (x, y) ∈ G−, and
dx
dt
= P+(x, y) = −βxy − (βI∗ + γ)x+ δy + δ(I∗ + γ
β
) (33a)
dy
dt
= Q+(x, y) = −βx(y + I∗) (33b)
for (x, y) ∈ G+.
The partial derivatives of P±, that is, of P+ and of P−, are denoted by P±x , P±xx, P±y etc., and similarly for Q±.
We define two quantities A± in terms of the functions P±, Q± and their derivatives at the point (0, 0):
A± =
2
3
(
P±x +Q
±
y
P±
− Q
±
xx
2Q±x
)
. (34)
9Theorem 1: Let the conditions
Q− = Q+ = 0, P− < 0, P+ > 0 (35)
Q−x < 0, Q
+
x < 0 (36)
be fulfilled at the point (0, 0). Then, A+−A− < 0 implies that the zero solution is asymptotically stable, whereas
A+ −A− > 0 implies that the zero solution is unstable.
All the conditions of Theorem (1) are satisfied in our case, together with A+ −A− < 0. The condition P− < 0
is equivalent to (27), i.e., the condition on I∗ that causes the stationary point to be on the line of discontinuity.
All the other conditions are straightforward to verify. For example, to prove that A+ − A− < 0 we can quickly
establish that A+ < 0 and A− > 0, again using (27).
Therefore, the stationary point (S, I) = ( δ
β
, I∗) is asymptotically stable.
E. Domains of Attraction
From Theorem 6, §13 [11] we know that for autonomous systems on the plane, it holds that if a half trajectory
T+ is bounded, then its ω-limit set Ω(T+) contains either a stationary point or a closed trajectory. Recall that the
ω-limit set of a half trajectory T+(x = φ(t), t0 ≤ t <∞) is the set of all points q for which there exists a sequence
t1, t2, . . . tending to ∞ such that φ(ti) −→ q as i −→∞.
In this section, we show that there are no solutions that are closed trajectories. So we can conclude that all
system trajectories converge to equilibrium points. When there is more than one equilibrium point, we show which
trajectories converge to which point.
The main result is that for any half trajectory T+, its ω-limit set Ω(T ) can only contain equilibrium points, that
is, X0 = (1, 0), X1 = (S1, I1) =
(
δ
β
,
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
)
, or X2 = (
δ
β
, I∗).
We will find the following two functions useful:
E(S, I) = S − S1 ln(S) + I + γ
β
ln(I), (S, I) ∈ D+ (37)
M(S, I) = S − (S1 + γ
β
) ln(S +
γ
β
) + I − I1 ln(I), (S, I) ∈ D−. (38)
It holds that E(S, I) is constant on trajectories in the area D+, and M(S, I) is decreasing along trajectories in the
area D−. Indeed, with some calculations it can be shown that
d
dt
E(S, I) =
∂E
∂S
dS
dt
+
∂E
∂I
dI
dt
= 0 (39)
d
dt
M(S, I) =
∂M
∂S
dS
dt
+
∂M
∂I
dI
dt
= −(βS − δ)
2
βS + γ
1 + γ
β
1 + δ
γ
≤ 0. (40)
First of all, we prove that a trajectory converges to X0 = (1, 0) if and only if it starts on the line I = 0: If it
starts on the line, then d
dt
I is zero, so I stays equal to 0, and the trajectory stays on the line. And d
dt
S is positive
always except on X0, so the trajectory converges to X0.
If the trajectory starts at a point (S0, I0), I0 > 0, then let M(S0, I0) = M0. We can see that, for any S it holds
that limI→0M(S, I) = ∞. So, if the trajectory comes close enough to the line I = 0, the function M(S, I) will
have to increase above M0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, the trajectory cannot converge to X0 = (1, 0).
From now on, we assume that on all points of a trajectory it holds that I > 0.
Assume that there exists a half trajectory T+ whose limit set Ω(T ) contains a closed trajectory Γ. By successively
eliminating properties of such a trajectory, we will prove that it cannot exist. Note that Lemma 1 below is trivial
if ( δ
β
, I∗) is an equilibrium point.
Lemma 1: The point ( δ
β
, I∗) cannot be on Γ.
Proof:
If (S, I) = ( δ
β
, I∗) is on Γ (say, at time t1), then, first of all, 0 /∈ F ( δβ , I∗), because otherwise the point ( δβ , I∗)
would be an equilibrium point, so it could not be part of a closed trajectory. Since 0 /∈ F ( δ
β
, I∗), the point X1 is
an equilibrium and it is distinct from ( δ
β
, I∗).
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We will now reach a contradiction by proving that Γ cannot approach (S, I) = ( δ
β
, I∗) for t > t1, thus Γ cannot
be a closed trajectory. If ( δ
β
, I∗) ∈ Γ, then the trajectory would have to exit the line L immediately after passing
through it (otherwise right uniqueness would be violated on the points of L contained in Γ).
Define a region ∆ǫ ⊆ D− around ( δβ , I∗) that includes all points where the M function has values at least equal
to M( δ
β
, I∗)− ǫ, for some small enough ǫ > 0 such that ∆ǫ does not include X1. Since M is continuous and X1
is distinct from ( δ
β
, I∗), ∆ǫ is well defined.
Γ, being a closed trajectory, has to encircle an equilibrium point (Thm. 7, §13 [11]). So, it would have to exit
∆ǫ and go around the point X1. But then, as M decreases along trajectories, Γ cannot reenter ∆ǫ before exiting
D−. It can only exit by crossing the line L somewhere on the interval (( δ
β
, I∗), (1− I∗, I∗)]. However, at ( δ
β
, I∗)
the function M(S, I∗) attains a minimum over S, so Γ cannot exit D− because it cannot approach L.
If (S, I) = ( δ
β
, I∗) is not on Γ, then on Γ there holds right uniqueness. Also, Ω(Γ) = Γ.
We will continue by proving that Γ cannot have more or fewer than two intersection points with L.
Lemma 2: A closed trajectory Γ that does not pass through the point ( δ
β
, I∗) cannot have either more than two
or fewer than two intersection points with the discontinuity line L. If it has two intersection points, they cannot be
on the same side of ( δ
β
, I∗).
Proof:
Denote by Γ ∩ L = {l1, l2, l3, . . .} the common points of Γ with L, and t1, t2, t3, . . . the corresponding times.
Γ ∩ L cannot be empty, because Γ cannot be completely contained within the area D−, because the function
M is decreasing in D−, nor within the area D+, because Γ has to encircle an equilibrium point, but there is no
equilibrium point in D+.
Γ ∩ L cannot be a singleton set. If there is only one point in Γ ∩ L, say l1, then Γ has to be in D− (except
for l1) because it has to encircle X1. Then, Γ has to exit L immediately, otherwise it would have more than one
common points with L. If Γ exits an ǫ-neighborhood of l1, then, using the function M(S, I) we can show that Γ
cannot return in an appropriate δ-neighborhood of l1, so Γ cannot be closed.
Let there be 3 or more distinct points in Γ ∩ L. At least two of these points are on the same side of the point
( δ
β
, I∗), assume the side on the right (S > δ
β
). Call them li and lj , and their corresponding times ti and tj . Assume
without loss of generality that li is the one closer to ( δβ , I
∗). Since li is distinct from ( δβ , I
∗), there is at least one
more point on L between ( δ
β
, I∗) and li. Call that point α, and consider the line segment LS from α to (1−I∗, I∗).
By construction, both li and lj are on LS. The segment LS is a transversal: it is intersected by trajectories only
in one direction, as d
dt
I > 0 for S > δ
β
. Also, right uniqueness holds on the points of LS.
By Lemma 3 §13 in [11], for a trajectory T the set Ω(T ) can intersect the transversal LS at not more than one
point. So, since Γ = Ω(Γ), the set Γ ∩ LS cannot contain more than one point, so we have a contradiction. We
reach a similar contradiction if we assume that li and lj are to the left of ( δβ , I
∗).
Lemma 3: A closed trajectory Γ cannot intersect the discontinuity line L on exactly two points that are on
opposite sides of the point ( δ
β
, I∗).
Proof:
Call A = (SA, I∗) the point in Γ ∩ L with SA < δβ , and call B = (SB, I∗) the one with SB > δβ .
Let Γ be parameterized by φ(t) = (x(t), y(t)), t ∈ [0, T ]; also φ(0) = φ(T ). The function φ(t) is a solution
of the differential inclusion, that is, φ˙(t) = (x˙(t), y˙(t)) ∈ F (φ(t)), t ∈ [0, T ]. Let tA, tB ∈ [0, T ] be such that
A = φ(tA) and B = φ(tB). Let αA, αB ∈ [0, 1] be such that x˙(tA) = −βxy − γx + αAγ(1 − y) and x˙(tB) =
−βxy − γx+ αBγ(1− y)
Define the functions P (x, y) and Q(x, y), (x, y) ∈ D \ {y, y > 0}:
P (x, y) = −1
y
y˙ = −1
y
(βxy − δy) = δ − βx (41)
Q(x, y) =
1
y
x˙ =


1
y
(−βxy + γ(1− x− y)), y < I∗
1
y
(−βxy − γx+ αAγ(1− y)), x ≤ δβ , y = I∗
1
y
(−βxy − γx+ αBγ(1− y)), x > δβ , y = I∗
1
y
(−βxy − γx), y > I∗
(42)
We compute the integral
∮
Γ Pdx+Qdy in two ways.
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For the first computation, we use the parametrization φ(t) = (x(t), y(t)) of Γ, so dx = x˙dt and dy = y˙dt. The
result is zero: ∮
Γ
Pdx+Qdy =
∫ T
0
−1
y
y˙x˙dt+
1
y
x˙y˙dt = 0. (43)
For the second computation, we split Q(x, y) into two functions, one continuous and one discontinuous, so that
Q(x, y) = Qc(x, y) +Qd(x, y).
Qc(x, y) =
1
y
(−βxy − γx) (44)
Qd(x, y) =


1
y
γ(1− y), y < I∗
1
y
αAγ(1− y), x ≤ δβ , y = I∗
1
y
αBγ(1− y), x > δβ , y = I∗
0, y > I∗
(45)
So now the original integral can be split into two:
∮
Γ Pdx+Qdy =
∮
Γ Pdx+ (Qc +Qd)dy =
∮
Γ Pdx+Qcdy +∮
ΓQddy. We use Green’s theorem to compute the first integral.∮
Γ
Pdx+Qcdy =
∫∫
Γ
∂Qc
∂x
− ∂P
∂y
dxdy =
∫∫
Γ
−β − γ
y
dxdy < 0. (46)
For the second integral
∮
ΓQddy, we define the function
Qextd (x, y) =
1
y
γ(1− y), (x, y) ∈ D \ {y, y > 0} (47)
and the curves Γ1 and Γ2: The curve Γ1 is the trajectory Γ restricted to y ≤ I∗. The direction of Γ1 is from A to
B. The curve Γ2 is the line segment of L joining B and A, with direction from B to A.
Observe that ∮
Γ
Qddy =
∮
Γ1∪Γ2
Qextd dy =
∫∫
Γ1∪Γ2
∂Qextd
∂x
dxdy = 0, (48)
where the first equality follows from Qd ≡ Qextd on Γ1 and dy = 0 on Γ2, whereas the last equality follows from
Green’s theorem, because Qextd is continuously differentiable.
We see that the result of (43) contradicts the result of (46) and (48). So, the trajectory Γ with the assumed
properties cannot exist.
From the previous lemmata, we conclude that there can be no closed trajectory Γ. Therefore, all trajectories have
to converge to equilibrium points.
F. Conclusion
In Figure 2 we see that the total fraction I =
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
of Infected at the system equilibrium increases with the
update rate γ, until I becomes equal to the threshold I∗. The reason for this increase is that, when the equilibrium
value of I is below I∗, the trajectories will eventually be completely contained in the domain D− (below I∗). In
this domain, at each time a Protected is informed about the value of I , he will choose to become Susceptible,
thus fueling the infection. In parallel, no Susceptible will choose to become Protected. The larger the value of γ,
the shorter time a user will spend being Protected, thus the smaller the fraction of Protected. However, a smaller
fraction of Protected implies a larger fraction of Infected, as the fraction of Susceptible at equilibrium is necessarily
δ
β
, i.e., it is independent of γ.
When the quantity
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
exceeds I∗, the equilibrium value of I is limited to I∗; further increases of γ have
no effect. The explanation is that, as soon as the instantaneous value of I exceeds I∗, Susceptible users switch
to Protected, and Protected users stay Protected, thus bringing the infection level below I∗. However, there is no
equilibrium point for the system in the domain D−, so the only possible equilibrium value of I is I∗. For I = I∗
there are in general many combinations of pSP (I∗) and pPS(I∗) that lead to an equilibrium, including one with
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pSP (I
∗) = 0 and pPS(I∗) > 0. That combination means that no Susceptible users become Protected, but some
Protected become Susceptible. Other combinations with both pSP (I∗) > 0 and pPS(I∗) > 0 would be harder to
justify, as they imply that at the same value of I∗ users would switch from Susceptible to Protected and back.
A side conclusion concerns the interaction of γ with I∗: We have seen that increasing γ will increase the
equilibrium value of I , but I’s maximum value will be limited to I∗, so if I∗ is low, the effect of increasing γ is
not severe.
I
γ
I∗
X1 : I(γ) =
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
X2 : I(γ) = I
∗
Fig. 2: The total fraction of Infected as a function of γ.
IV. THE USERS ARE NOT STRICTLY RATIONAL
The user behavior functions pSP (I) and pPS(I) are continuously differentiable, and we require that ddI pSP (I) > 0
and d
dI
pSP (I) < 0. Other than that, the two functions are arbitrary.
A. Stationary Points
The equilibrium points of the system are found by solving for x the equation F (x) = 0:
d
dt
S = 0 = −βSI − γSpSP (I) + γ(1− S − I)pPS(I) (49a)
d
dt
I = 0 = βSI − δI (49b)
From (49b) we see that either I = 0 or S = δ
β
.
• Equilibrium point X0
Substituting I = 0 into (49a), we have that X0 = (S0, I0) =
(
pPS(0)
pSP (0)+pPS(0)
, 0
)
. These values of (S0, I0) are
always admissible as they are always non-negative and at most equal to 1.
Recalling the meaning of pPS(0) and pSP (0), we can reasonably expect that pPS(0) = 1 and pSP (0) = 0:
Protected have no reason to remain Protected, and Susceptible have no reason to become Protected, when
there is no infection in the network. In this case, X0 is the point (1, 0).
• Equilibrium point X1
Substituting S = δ
β
into (49a), we see that I has to satisfy
g(I) ≡ −δI − γδ
β
pSP (I) + γ
(
1− δ
β
− I
)
pPS(I) = 0. (50)
To solve g(I) = 0 for I we need to know the two response functions pSP (I) and pPS(I). But even without
knowing them, we can still prove that g(I) = 0 has a unique solution for I ∈ [0, 1] under the condition that
δ
β
≤ pPS(0)
pSP (0) + pPS(0)
. (51)
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We first show that g(I) monotonically decreases in the interval [0, 1], and then we show that, under the
condition (51), g(0)g(1) ≤ 0. We can then conclude that there is exactly one solution of g(I) = 0 in the
interval [0, 1].
d
dI
g(I) = −δ − γδ
β
d
dI
pSP (I)− γpPS(I) + γ
(
1− δ
β
− I
)
d
dI
pPS(I) (52)
And, as d
dI
pSP (I) > 0 and ddI pSP (I) < 0, we can see that
dg(I)
dI
< 0,∀β, γ, δ > 0, (53)
so g(I) monotonically decreases.
Under the condition (51), g(0) is non-negative:
g(0) = −γδ
β
pSP (0) + γ
(
1− δ
β
)
pPS(0) (54)
g(0) ≥ 0⇔ δ
β
≤ pPS(0)
pSP (0) + pPS(0)
, (55)
which is exactly condition (51).
And now we prove that g(1) is always negative.
g(1) = −δ − γδ
β
pSP (1)− γ δ
β
pPS(1) (56)
Therefore:
g(1) < 0,∀β, γ, δ > 0. (57)
Denoting by I1 the solution of g(I) = 0, we can now conclude that X1 = (S1, I1) = ( δβ , I1) is uniquely
determined under (51). The values S1, I1 are admissible as they are both between 0 and 1. Note that if (51)
does not hold then both g(0) < 0 and g(1) < 0, so the monotonicity of g in [0, 1] implies that X1 does not
exist. Consequently, (51) is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of X1.
B. Local Asymptotic Stability
To examine the (local) stability of the equilibrium points X0 and X1 we compute the Jacobian of the system
(49) and evaluate it at these two points.
J(S, I) =
(
j11 j12
j21 j22
)
(58)
where
j11 =− βI − γ(pSP (I) + pPS(I)) (59a)
j12 =− βS − γS d
dI
pSP (I)− γpPS(I) + γ(1− S − I) d
dI
pSP (I) (59b)
j21 =βI (59c)
j22 =βS − δ (59d)
Observe that both j11 and j12 are negative for all S and I: recall our assumption that dpSP (I)dI > 0 and
dpSP (I)
dI
< 0.
For the case of X0, the Jacobian is
J(X0) =
(
−γ(pSP (0) + pPS(0)) J(X0)12
0 β pPS(0)
pSP (0)+pPS(0)
− δ
)
(60)
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where the value of J(X0)12 is irrelevant for the calculation of the eigenvalues. The two eigenvalues of J(X0) are
the two diagonal entries:
λ01 =− γ(pSP (0) + pPS(0)) (61)
λ02 =β
pPS(0)
pSP (0) + pPS(0)
− δ (62)
The first eigenvalue, λ01, is always negative except in the trivial case where pSP (0) = pPS(0) = 0. The second
one is negative if and only if
δ
β
>
pPS(0)
pSP (0) + pPS(0)
, (63)
which is exactly the opposite of condition (51). So, X0 is stable when X1 does not exist.
For the case of X1 the Jacobian is
J(X1) =
(
J(X1)11 J(X1)12
βI1 0
)
(64)
The eigenvalues have the following form:
λ11, λ
1
2 =
1
2
(
J(X1)11 ±
√
J(X1)211 + 4βI1J(X1)12
)
(65)
They are both negative, since J(X1)11 and J(X1)12 are negative as mentioned before. So, X1 is stable whenever
it exists.
C. Domains of Attraction
Since the system is two-dimensional and F is continuously differentiable, we can use Dulac’s criterion to show
that the system can have no periodic trajectory.
Theorem 2 (Dulac’s criterion): Let A be a simply connected domain. If there exists a continuously differentiable
function h : A −→ R such that ∇ · (hF ) is continuous and non-zero on A, then no periodic trajectory can lie
entirely in A.
In our case, the domain A is the state space excluding the line I = 0. Note that there can be no periodic trajectory
that passes from a point with I = 0. We select as function h the function h(S, I) = 1
I
. We compute ∇ · (hF ) to be
∇ · (hF ) = −β − γ pSP (I)
I
− γ pPS(I)
I
< 0,∀(S, I) ∈ A, (66)
which is continuous and non-zero in A. Then, from Dulac’s criterion, no periodic trajectory lies entirely in A,
and, consequently, the system has no periodic trajectory at all. From the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem, the system
can only converge to a periodic trajectory or an equilibrium point; so, we can conclude that every trajectory must
converge to an equilibrium point, that is, either to X0 or X1.
More precisely, when (51) does not hold, only X0 exists so all trajectories converge to X0. When (51) holds,
both X0 and X1 exist, and X0 is a saddle point: Trajectories starting on the line I = 0 approach X0 along the
line I = 0, whereas all other trajectories converge to X1. Indeed, if I(0) > 0, then the corresponding trajectory
will have I(t) > 0,∀t > 0. The reason is that if I(t0) = 0 for some finite t0 > 0, then the uniqueness of solutions
would be violated at (S(t0), I(t0)), because it would be a common point with the trajectories that approach X0
along the line I = 0. If t0 = ∞, i.e., the trajectory with I(0) > 0 converges asymptotically to X0 while keeping
I(t) > 0, then close enough to X0 we reach a contradiction as ddtI will become positive (see (51) and (49b)).
D. Conclusion
The equilibrium point X0 is unaffected by γ. We show now that, at X1 =
(
δ
β
, I1
)
, the equilibrium level of the
Infected increases with γ. To this end, we take the derivative dI1
dγ
and we see that is always positive.
We know that I1 satisfies g(I1) = 0, i.e.,
− δI1 − γδ
β
pSP (I1) + γ(1− δ
β
− I1)pPS(I1) = 0 (67)
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Differentiating with respect to γ, then using the chain rule, and finally collecting terms, we have
dI1
dγ
(
−δ − γδ
β
dpSP (I1)
dI1
− γpPS(I1) + γ(1− δ
β
− I1)dpPS(I1)
dI1
)
=
δ
β
pSP (I1)− (1− δ
β
− I1)pPS(I1).
(68)
The term in the parenthesis on the left-hand side is negative, and so is the right-hand side. Therefore, dI1
dγ
is positive.
The negativity of the left-hand side parenthesis is deduced from dpSP (I1)
dI1
> 0 and dpPS(I1)
dI1
< 0. The negativity
of δ
β
pSP (I1)− (1− δβ − I1)pPS(I1) is deduced from (67): δβpSP (I1)− (1− δβ − I1)pPS(I1) = − δγ I1 < 0.
V. THE USERS HAVE DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR FUNCTIONS
So far, we have assumed that all users behave in the same way, which might be unrealistic in practice. In this
section, we model the case when users are split into two classes, each with a different threshold behavior function.
Note that we choose to have two classes to keep the presentation simple, but we believe that our results carry over
to multiple user classes.
A fraction ac of users are in class c = 1, 2, and a1+a2 = 1. The fractions of Susceptible, Infected, and Protected
in class c are denoted by Sc, Ic, P c, and it holds that Sc+ Ic+P c = ac. Users do not change classes, so a user in
S1 will move, if infected, to I1 and then to P 1. The total fraction of Susceptible users is denoted by S(= S1+S2),
and similarly for Infected, I(= I1 + I2), and for Protected P (= P 1 + P 2). Susceptible users can be infected by
an Infected user of any class, not just by an Infected of their own class.
Users in different classes differ in their response to received alerts, i.e., the functions pSP (I) and pPS(I) become
pcSP (I) and pcPS(I) for users in class c. Note that the functions depend on I , not on Ic. We will study discontinuous
best response functions with a different threshold I∗c for each class. Without loss of generality, we require I∗1 < I∗2.
pcSP (I) =


0 I < I∗c
[0, 1] I = I∗c
1 I > I∗c
pcPS(I) =


1 I < I∗c
[0, 1] I = I∗c
0 I > I∗c
(69)
The first class of users that we will model are users with a low threshold I∗1 = 0.1, who we call Responsible.
Because of their low threshold, these users become Protected easily, but they do not easily switch from Protected
to Susceptible. We call them Responsible because the way they behave helps reduce the infection. The second class
of users, who we call Selfish, have a high threshold I∗1 = 0.9. This means that they hardly ever decide to switch
from Susceptible to Protected, whereas they almost always decide to leave the Protected state.
In the next section, we simulate the system on human mobility traces, and we confirm our previous conclusion
that the equilibrium level of infection increases with the update rate γ.
VI. SIMULATIONS ON MOBILITY TRACES
We validate our conclusions using simulations on human mobility traces. The traces that we use are Bluetooth
contacts among 41 devices given to participants in a conference [30]. The traces were collected over a period of
approximately 72 hours.
The contact rate β is determined by the traces. Actually, β is a function of time β(t), since the number of contacts
per time unit fluctuates depending on the time of day. We want to establish whether the fraction of Infected indeed
increases for larger values of the update rate γ. For the simulations that follow, we set δ = (6hr)−1, and we plot
the system trajectories on the S − I plane (average of 30 simulations) for three different values of γ, (1hr)−1,
(6hr)−1, and (24hr)−1. The initial conditions for all simulations were 1 Infected and 40 Susceptible. In the case
of two user classes, the initially Infected user is of class 2 (Selfish). Each simulation runs until either there are no
Infected, or the end of the traces is reached.
For the single user class case, we use a piecewise continuous response function (Figure 3):
pSP (I) =


0 I < I∗ − ǫ2
1
ǫ
(I − I∗ + ǫ2) I∗ − ǫ2 < I < I∗ + ǫ2
1 I > I∗ + ǫ2
(70)
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Fig. 3: The user response function pSP (I) used in the simulations: The probability that a Susceptible user switches
to being Protected, upon learning the fraction I of Infected users in the network.
and pPS(I) = 1− pSP (I).
In Figure 4 we plot simulation results for I∗ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9, and ǫ = 0.001, omitting an initial transient phase.
Since β(t) is not constant, the system state oscillates between two equilibrium points, X0 (when β(t) is low enough
that δ > β(t)) and either X1 or X2, depending on whether (25) is satisfied or not
(
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
< I∗
)
. Despite these
periodicities, we see that for increasing values of γ the system trajectories go through higher values of I , thus
confirming our main conclusion that the infection level increases with the update rate. The effect of lowering I∗ is
that it limits the maximum infection at the equilibrium, so the trajectories are capped at values of I not far above
I∗. For lower values of I∗, we see that the effect of γ on the Infected is less pronounced.
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Fig. 4: The trajectory of the system (average of 30 simulations) on the SI plane, when δ = (6hr)−1 and γ takes the
values (1hr)−1, (6hr)−1, and (24hr)−1. The thresholds are I∗ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9. We see that the network experiences
higher numbers of Infected devices for higher values of γ, and for I∗ = 0.1, 0.5 we also observe the limiting effect
of I∗.
For the two-user class case, we use separate piecewise continuous response functions for each class. Users of
class 1 (Responsible) have a threshold of I∗1 = 0.1 and users of class 2 (Selfish) have a threshold of I∗2 = 0.9.
For both classes ǫ = 0.001.
In Figure 5 we plot the system trajectories, again omitting an initial transient phase, for the Susceptible and
Infected of 1) the total population (first column), 2) the Responsible subpopulation (second column), and 3)
the Selfish subpopulation (third column). Each row corresponds to a different split of the total population into
Responsible and Selfish subpopulations. In the first row, the Responsible-Selfish split is 20%-80%, in the second
row it is 50%-50%, and in the third row it is 80%-20%.
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We again confirm the conclusion that the fraction of Infected in the total population increases for larger values of
γ. Two secondary conclusions relate to the situation within each subpopulation: The Selfish user trajectories seem
as if the Selfish were isolated. That is, their trajectories are very similar to those they would follow if they were
alone in the network (compare with the case I∗ = 0.9 in Figure 4). The Responsible users, on the contrary, stay
mostly in the bottom left region, which means that many of them stay Protected. Comparing with the case I∗ = 0.9
in Figure 4, we see that they now stay a bit closer to the bottom left corner: This means that the Selfish-caused
infection keeps more of them Protected than if they were alone in the network. The observations on the Selfish and
on the Responsible are mutually compatible, as users that are Protected (here, the Responsible) do not interact with
the rest of the network, so the trajectories of the remaining users (here, the Selfish) seem as if they were isolated.
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Fig. 5: The trajectory of the system (average of 30 simulations) on the SI plane, when δ = (6hr)−1 and γ takes
the values (1hr)−1, (6hr)−1, and (24hr)−1. Users are split into two classes: the Responsible, with I∗ = 0.1, and
the Selfish, with I∗ = 0.9. The columns correspond to the Total Population, the Responsible subpopulation, and
the Selfish subpopulation. The rows correspond to a total population split of 20%-80%, 50%-50%, and 80%-20%
into Responsible and Selfish. We see, as in the case of a single user class, that the network experiences higher
numbers of Infected devices for higher values of γ. In the current case of multiple user classes, the higher number
of Infected is mostly due to the Selfish users.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the effect of network users being cost-sensitive when deploying security measures. In particular,
if users increasingly deploy security upon learning that the level of network infection is higher, and retract the
deployment when the level of infection drops, then a higher learning rate leads to a higher equilibrium level of
infected users.
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We reach this same conclusion in three scenarios. Our main scenario is when users are strictly rational cost
minimizers, having a discontinuous multi-valued best response behavior. The conclusion does not change when
the response function is an arbitrary continuous single-valued function, as long as the function implies that users
increasingly choose protection as the level of infection rises. Finally, the conclusion remains valid even when there
are two classes of users, each class with a different threshold function. These scenarios are studied both theoretically,
by using a system of differential inclusions or differential equations, and also they are validated with simulations
on human mobility traces.
We use the theory of differential inclusions to prove properties (existence, uniqueness, stability) of the system
trajectories in the case of multivalued response functions. In the case of uniform user behavior, either continuous
or discontinuous, the system is two-dimensional, and we are able to exclude the existence of periodic trajectories
and to characterize the domains of attraction for each equilibrium point.
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